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ABSTRACT
The European Union’s (EU) involvement in high-profile and controversial competition 
disputes has raised questions about the Union’s decision-making in the regulation of 
international business activity. Why does the EU decide to pursue such cases that hold 
the potential to destabilise bilateral and multilateral trading relations? This paper 
investigates the role of international and domestic factors that influence the EU’s 
competition decisions as applied to foreign corporations. To explain the EU’s decisions 
in external competition policy, the paper considers the causal influence of economic 
internationalization as well as the domestic pressures exerted by firms and politicians 
during the merger review process. Empirically, the paper analyses two merger disputes 
between the EU and the United States of America (US)—the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas merger and the 2001 GE-Honeywell merger—that provide useful insights and 
lessons for practitioners and academics alike. The paper finds that, despite its
destabilising potential, the EU decides to pursue a vigorous external competition policy 
primarily as the result of international economic pressures and domestic political 
dynamics. While the preferences and strategies of individual firms play only a limited 
role in the EU’s decision-making in external competition policy, they seem to play a 
more significant role in US politicians’ decisions to intervene in transatlantic merger 
review cases.1
I. Introduction
Since the late 19
th century, the gradual proliferation of national competition 
policies reflects the emergence of free market economies throughout the world. These 
competition policies—broadly including merger review, cartel and monopoly policies 
and state aids—operate as regulatory tools to prevent anticompetitive business activity 
from undermining the benefits of competition in a domestic free market economy. 
However, as markets internationalize, the implementation of competition policy is no 
longer simply a behind-the-border matter of regulating domestic business activity.
The European Union’s (EU) involvement in a number of high-profile and 
controversial competition policy disputes has raised serious questions about the Union’s 
decision-making in the regulation of business activity that is becoming increasingly 
international. Why does the EU decide to pursue such competition cases that hold the 
potential to destabilise bilateral and multilateral trading relations?
This paper provides a preliminary investigation of the EU’s external competition 
policy. The analysis scrutinizes the international and domestic factors that drive the EU’s 
decision-making in this policy area as applied to foreign corporations. In particular, the 
roles and decisions of regulators, politicians and firms are examined in the context of two 
merger disputes between the EU and the United States of America (US)—the 1997 
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger and the 2001 GE-Honeywell (GEH)
merger—that provide useful insights and lessons for practitioners and academics alike.
To explain EU regulatory decisions in external competition policy, the paper 
considers the causal influence of economic internationalization as well as the practical 
influence of firms exerting pressure during the merger review process and politicians 
deciding to intervene in regulatory decisions. These factors are traced empirically through 
four stages of the merger review process—initial contacts, notification contacts, review 
process contacts and remedial contacts—with particular emphasis on the BMD and GEH 
cases in which EU-US cooperation failed to prevent political intervention. The paper 
finds that, despite its destabilising potential, the EU decides to pursue a vigorous external 
competition policy primarily as the result of international economic pressures and 
domestic political dynamics. While the preferences and strategies of individual firms play 2
only a limited role in the EU’s implementation of its external competition policy, they 
seem to play a larger role in US politicians’ decisions to intervene in the transatlantic 
merger review cases studied herein.
The paper begins by discussing the reasons why EU competition regulators
pursue implementation cooperation with US competition authorities. Next, the paper
outlines four different stages of transatlantic implementation cooperation in merger 
review: initial contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial 
contacts. Throughout these different stages of cooperation, EU and US competition 
regulators generally operate without direct political intervention. The paper then
undertakes an in depth analysis of two merger cases (BMD and GEH) in which EU-US 
cooperation failed to prevent political intervention. A comparison across the four stages 
of cooperation in both cases suggests a number of lessons for regulators, politicians and 
merging firms. The paper then provides preliminary comments on the factors that 
influence political decisions to intervene. The final section summarizes the findings.
II. Transatlantic Implementation Cooperation—Cooperative Merger Review in 
Practice
At a basic level, EU-US implementation cooperation is designed to meet an 
external challenge—economic internationalization (EI)—to domestic competition 
policy.
1 In an EI environment, competition authorities find that internationally-oriented 
merger activity increasingly threatens to outpace their legal and administrative resources 
to enforce domestic competition policy. Because EI increases the number of 
internationally-oriented mergers, it also increases the potential for divergent regulatory 
decisions by EU and US competition authorities.
EI challenges conventional notions of jurisdiction based on sovereign territory. 
More specifically, it changes the context in which regulators act by increasing their need 
to enforce competition policy on firms that may not be based in their domestic 
jurisdiction. Without international cooperation, the result is an increase in the likelihood 
                                                          
1 EI is conceived herein as a change in the international economy, which resembles the common notion of 
economic globalization. However, the current study uses the term “internationalization” with the intent of 
distancing itself from frequent claims in the globalization literature that the phenomenon is 1) making “the 
state” obsolete, and/or 2) occurring globally.3
of divergent decisions that may prompt political intervention. John Parisi, Counsel for 
European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust Division of the FTC, succinctly 
explains the nature of the problem:
As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign trade and 
investment opportunities, antitrust compliance issues have arisen which 
transcend national borders and have led antitrust authorities in the affected 
jurisdictions to communicate, co-operate, and co-ordinate their efforts to 
achieve compatible enforcement results (1999, 133).
The challenges of EI and the cooperative responses needed are clear to 
competition regulators who wish to avoid political intervention. This preference is 
reflected in the desire to achieve compatible enforcement results (i.e., convergent 
decisions) in individual cases that are investigated simultaneously. Such claims benefit 
from further clarification of the precise reasons why, in an EI environment, EU and US 
competition authorities will choose to pursue implementation cooperation.
First, competition authorities will cooperate internationally when implementing 
competition policy in order to increase information acquisition. As Devuyst argues, 
“even if a competition agency is ready to use its antitrust rules extraterritorially, 
information central to the investigation is often located outside the jurisdiction of the 
competition authority using the extraterritoriality principle and is thus beyond its reach. 
Without the necessary proof, competition authorities are unable to take remedial action” 
(2000, 323). In an EI environment, the problems created by information asymmetries in 
internationally-oriented merger cases present real challenges to the effective enforcement 
of domestic competition policy. Implementation cooperation thus reflects a crucial role 
for information exchanges in competition policy.
As discussed below, information exchanges are crucial to regulatory cooperation 
and central to each stage of implementation cooperation. In addition, the centrality of 
information provides merging firms with an opening to influence implementation 
cooperation. Domestic EU and US laws create this opening by providing for the 
protection of confidential business information in the merger review process. If firms do 
not waive their rights to confidentiality in merger cases, cooperative analyses can be 
seriously hindered. Citing the obstacles created by domestic confidentiality provisions, 
ICPAC argues4
These laws have a particularly significant impact on the merger review 
process, because much of the information used to analyze a proposed 
transaction comes from extremely sensitive, confidential information 
relating to the companies’ strategies, investment plans, and marketing goals 
and methods. It is this information that frequently proves most useful in 
analyzing a proposed transaction (2000, 65).
A series of transatlantic agreements on competition policy—the 1991 Bilateral 
Agreement, 1998 Positive Comity Agreement and 1999 Administrative Arrangements on 
Attendance—explicitly recognize and respect domestic laws protecting confidentiality.
2
As a result, competition regulators must obtain waivers from the merging firms before 
sharing confidential information with their foreign counterparts.
3 Indeed, competition 
regulators must often obtain multiple waivers to cover different types of information and 
different stages of the review process.
Despite these legal provisions, competition regulators have devised discretionary 
means through which to address the obstacles created by confidentiality requirements. In 
addition, waivers of confidentiality have become routine in EU-US implementation 
cooperation in merger review (Svetlicinii 2006). This is so because, by waiving rights of 
confidentiality, firms expedite the review process and increase the likelihood of 
regulators reaching convergent decisions (Parisi 1999, 140).
4 Merging firms generally 
prefer avoiding delays in the review process due to the time sensitivity of the transaction. 
Similarly, merging firms generally prefer convergent decisions on remedies (if remedies 
are necessary) because disagreements over such matters can delay the conclusion of the 
merger.
The second reason why competition authorities will cooperate internationally 
when implementing competition policy is to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. 
                                                          
2 Because the current study investigates implementation cooperation in merger review, the analysis does 
not consider cases brought under the Positive Comity Agreement (PCA). Due to domestic laws that require 
merger reviews under certain circumstances, the PCA does not apply to merger review.
3 The EU and US deal differently with confidential information: “Although the end result may be much the 
same, information gathered in the US tends to be automatically treated as confidential. Under the European 
system, those supplying information must request such confidentiality” (Devuyst 2001, 147). Ham provides 
a useful list of the domestic legal constraints in both the EU and US that protect confidential information. 
These  include the EU’s  Regulation  17,  parts  of the US Code  and the FTC  Act (1993,  588). See also 
Svetlicinii (2006).
4 See Svetlicinii (2006) and Parisi (1999) for reasons why firms also may be reluctant to waive rights to 
confidentiality.5
This reason is linked directly to and follows from the increasing information exchanges. 
As Devuyst argues,
there is a need to avoid conflicts of law and remedies to international cases. 
As international business arrangements may face examination by different 
authorities at the same time, divergences in the laws applicable to the same 
set of facts may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality of the 
behavior under review. Even where a common view exists among 
competition agencies as to the anticompetitive nature of the conduct, the 
remedies imposed in each jurisdiction may be incompatible. Cooperation is 
thus seen as necessary to reduce the likelihood of such conflicts (2000, 
323).
It is important to distinguish between two possible types of divergent decisions: 
inconsistent and conflicting. Inconsistent decisions occur when “authorities who have 
chosen to take no action or to impose a ‘lesser’ remedy against a proposed transaction 
generally do not feel aggrieved by actions taken in other jurisdictions” (ICPAC 2000, 
52). Inconsistent decisions do not challenge the ability of a regulator in one jurisdiction to 
implement its statutory mandate and require no further work to reconcile the 
inconsistencies. However, as will be discussed below, inconsistent decisions can still 
prompt political intervention. Regulators, therefore, will strive to avoid inconsistent 
decisions because they are often perceived by politicians as threats to national 
sovereignty and/or their domestic constituents’ interests.
Divergent decisions can also be conflicting. This occurs when merging firms are 
unable to comply simultaneously with the decisions reached in two different jurisdictions. 
In such a case, the remedies imposed by one jurisdiction may “impact the remedies 
available to another jurisdiction. This is particularly problematic in largely global 
transactions where the impact of various remedies may differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction” (ICPAC 2000, 52-53, note 38). Regulators strive to avoid conflicting 
decisions because of the perception they create for politicians. As with inconsistent 
decisions, politicians are likely to perceive conflicting decisions as threats to national 
sovereignty and/or their domestic constituents’ interests. Challenges of this type can lead 
to international conflicts, including trade wars.6
Thus, both types of divergent decisions—inconsistent and conflicting—can 
prompt political intervention (Schaub 2002, 11; Monti 2000, 2).
5 As Charles S. Stark, 
Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section in the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division, argues:
in cases in which the U.S. and EU are reviewing the same transaction, both 
jurisdictions consider themselves as having a stake in reaching, insofar as 
possible, consistent, or at the very least non-conflicting, outcomes. The 
reasons for this should be evident. Divergent antitrust approaches to the 
same transaction undermine confidence in the process; they risk imposing 
inconsistent requirements on the firms, or frustrating the remedial 
objectives of one or another of the antitrust authorities; and they may create 
frictions or suspicions that can extend beyond the antitrust arena—as we 
witnessed in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas matter (2000, 5).
According to Devuyst, the third reason why competition authorities will cooperate 
internationally when implementing competition policy is to reduce duplication of work 
(i.e., various investigative efforts). As Devuyst argues, “cooperation would help to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of work and costs, both for the competition authorities involved 
and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review” (2000, 323). While an 
important motivation for international cooperation, this reason is less important in merger 
cases than in non-merger cases (Devuyst 2001, 140). In merger cases, some duplication 
of work in the review process is mandatory due to domestic law requiring each authority 
to act under certain circumstances. The competition regulators are not allowed to 
determine at their own discretion whether or not they will initiate a particular merger 
review. Rather, they are statutorily required to open investigations when a transaction 
meets thresholds established by the US’s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) and the EU’s 
Merger Control Regulation (MCR). As soon as proceedings have been opened, 
duplication of work becomes apparent as, for example, the competition regulators seek a 
considerable amount of identical information through the US’s HSR filing and EU’s 
Form CO requirements.
                                                          
5 The EU’s Director-General for Competition notes this linkage: “When divergences do occur, we must 
learn to manage them and avoid that they escalate into high-profile transatlantic political disputes” (Schaub 
2002). As ICPAC argues, “When divergence [in decisions] occurs, it is the agencies that must often explain 
and at times attempt to reconcile their differences. Clashes also may lead to trade wars” (2000, 41). On the 
possibility of trade wars, see also Karpel (1998, 1067).7
In summary, the primary reasons for competition regulators to cooperate in the 
implementation of merger review are to increase information exchanges and to reduce the 
likelihood of divergent decisions. Devuyst’s third reason—to reduce duplication of 
work—is less important in merger review due to domestic laws requiring competition 
regulators to review the same merger. In addition, these reasons also support the 
argument regarding the causal stimulus of EI and a contention that competition regulators
pursue their desire to maximize certainty and decision-making authority via discretionary 
implementation cooperation. The next section elaborates these insights across the 
different practical stages of transatlantic implementation cooperation in merger review.
III. The Practical Stages of Implementation Cooperation in Merger Review
The process of implementation cooperation can be disaggregated into four stages: 
initial contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial contacts.
Across each stage of implementation cooperation, the EU and US competition authorities 
are engaging in behavior designed to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions in 
individual merger cases. This behavior reflects the concern of the regulators that 
divergent decisions are typically perceived by politicians as likely to affect adversely 
their national and/or constituent interests. If politicians form this perception in individual 
merger cases, their likelihood of intervening increases. The competition regulators prefer 
avoiding such interventions.
In general, the record of individual merger cases suggests that EU-US 
implementation cooperation has met the challenge of EI. Official commentators on both 
sides of the Atlantic frequently declare the successes of EU-US implementation 
cooperation. For example, as former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky argues,
it is hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and coordination between 
enforcement officials in Europe and the United States could be much 
improved. Within the bounds of confidentiality rules, we share, on a 
regular and continuing basis, views and information about particular 
transactions, coordinate the timing of our review process to the extent 
feasible, and almost always achieve consistent remedies (2000).
Parisi agrees with this general assessment of EU-US implementation cooperation: “These 
efforts succeed in the vast majority of cases, despite differences in laws, procedures, and, 8
sometimes, the interests of the affected countries” (1999, 133).
6 Despite these claims of 
success, it is useful to describe EU-US implementation cooperation in greater detail in 
order to identify areas in which problems can arise in transatlantic merger review.
1. Initial Contacts
The current study investigates concurrent jurisdiction merger cases that meet 
specific statutory thresholds found in the US’s HSR and the EU’s MCR. When mergers 
meet these thresholds, the firms must notify both the US and EU competition authorities 
of their intent to merge. Most EU-US implementation cooperation occurs after the
competition authorities have received such formal notifications from the firms. However, 
EU-US implementation cooperation may begin even before merging firms submit a 
formal notification to the respective competition authorities. This section discusses the 
dynamics of competition authorities engaging in such informal initial contacts before 
receiving the formal notification of a proposed merger.
Initial contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the competition 
regulators. The domestic statutes governing EU and US merger review do not directly 
address these initial contacts. Like the other stages of implementation cooperation 
discussed below, these initial contacts emerged under the framework of the 1991 
Bilateral Agreement. After signing the Bilateral, EU and US competition authorities 
devised, under their discretionary authority, a variety of ways to formalize their 
cooperation in practice. Such initial contacts, while not explicitly mentioned in the 
Bilateral, are one example of the agents increasing their discretionary means to pursue 
implementation cooperation.
During the merger review process, EU and US competition authorities are in 
contact with each other on a daily basis via telephone calls, faxes, emails and face-to-face 
interactions (Janow 2000, 44). This is particularly true of lower-level case managers and 
handlers who focus on the economic and legal analysis of the merger review process. 
During the course of daily contacts, individual case managers and handlers may, and 
often do, discuss pending mergers that have not yet been formally notified to one or both 
                                                          
6 For similar arguments from academics and competition officials, see Fox (2007); Barnett (2006); Monti 
(2004, 2001a); Pate (2004); James (2002, 2001); Schaub (2002); Melamed (2000); Gerber (1999).9
of the competition authorities—the beginning of the initial contacts stage. The regulators
can sometimes be alerted to pending mergers simply by reading financial newspapers or 
through informal discussions with firms. In such cases, the merger may not have been 
formally notified, but the competition regulators can bring it to the attention of their 
foreign counterparts and discuss its implications in a hypothetical sense. These 
discussions must remain hypothetical and avoid concrete details because the regulators 
take great care not to broach confidentiality requirements during such informal initial 
contacts.
Initial contacts can function as an early warning system for possibly divergent 
analyses between EU and US competition regulators. For example, in order to respect 
confidentiality requirements, EU and US competition authorities frequently engage in 
hypothetical discussions over market definitions and other analytical concepts of merger 
review that may apply to individual merger cases soon to be notified. In such cases, the 
regulators may speak in loose terms about, for example, a pending notification that is 
expected from “some firms” in “some market”. Thus, while respecting confidentiality 
requirements, regulators are able to make informal initial contacts as the first stage of 
implementation cooperation. By discussing market definitions and analytical concepts, 
even hypothetically, before receipt of the formal notification, the regulators can alert each 
other to the potential use of different approaches to evaluating a merger that could lead to 
divergent decisions. Of course, if the firms proposing a merger agree to waive their rights 
to confidentiality, initial contacts need not be limited to hypothetical discussions.
The European Commission provides a useful example of the fruits of cooperation 
that can follow from informal initial contacts:
Bilateral cooperation was particularly intensive with regard to the large oil 
merger cases, most notably with regard to the Exxon/Mobil merger. 
Informal contacts between the FTC and the Commission started soon after 
the announcement of the Exxon/Mobil transaction (December 1998), long 
before the formal notification occurred in May 1999. This allowed the EU 
and US authorities to discuss the particular competition concerns for future 
oil and gas output which they feared might stem from the creation of so-
called ‘super majors’ (European Commission 2000a, 99).
Thus, in the Exxon/Mobil merger case, informal initial contacts reduced the likelihood of 
divergent decisions because EU and US competition regulators were able to discuss the 10
parameters of relevant product markets (oil and gas), the identification and characteristics 
of possibly dominant positions (super majors) and the future market impact of the 
transaction. All of these cooperative exchanges of information occurred under the 
discretionary authority of the regulators and were initiated approximately five months 
prior to the receipt of formal notification of the merger. As a result, the competition 
regulators were able to discuss in detail important aspects of the merger and coordinate 
their approaches long before the statutorily mandated timetables were set in motion by 
the formal notification.
Initial contacts can significantly expand the competition regulators’ discretion 
because they allow information exchanges prior to opening the formal procedures for 
cooperation under the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. Because regulators can discuss 
expected mergers and exchange information prior to the firms’ formal notification, initial 
contacts also increase discretionary flexibility regarding the strict statutory procedures 
(including formal deadlines) embodied in the HSR and MCR.
2. Notification Contacts
The next stage of implementation cooperation is characterized by notification 
contacts. These notifications contacts are formal, written exchanges between the 
competition regulators. As such, they should not be confused with the formal 
notifications that merging firms are required to submit separately to the regulators 
pursuant to the HSR and MCR.
Notifications occur when one regulator informs the other that it is initiating a 
competition investigation that may affect interests in the foreign jurisdiction. These 
notification contacts are explicitly mentioned in the 1991 Bilateral Agreement and the 
2002 EU-US Guidelines on Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations.
7
According to these frameworks, this stage of implementation cooperation is triggered 
when merger review (or other non-merger proceedings) by one jurisdiction may affect the 
“important interests” of the other jurisdiction. Article II.2 of the Bilateral includes a 
number of circumstances that ordinarily trigger implementation cooperation, and 
                                                          
7 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/eu_us.pdf, last accessed 18 March 2009.11
“thereby give each party the opportunity to determine the extent to which its important 
interests might be affected” (Parisi 1999, 136).
8
Due to differences in domestic legislation, the EU and US deal with these 
notifications differently. The Commission notes differences in notification procedures 
that arise from EU and US domestic legislation and summarizes the EU-US notification 
process as follows:
on receipt of a notification [from the merging firms], the Commission 
publishes a notice of the fact of the notification [from the merging firms] in 
the Official Journal. Thus the proposed merger is made public at the outset 
and all mergers meeting the criteria for notification to the US are notified, 
even where, on subsequent examination, they do not raise competitive 
concerns. The corresponding US legislation
9 requires that the fact of a 
merger filing, as well as its content, remain confidential. Thus the US 
authorities notify the Commission only when, after a preliminary 
examination, they decide to open an investigation into the proposed merger 
(1996, 3.1).
3. Review Process Contacts
Following the receipt of a formal EU-US notification, the competition regulators
engage in a variety of cooperative contacts during their respective review processes. 
These review process contacts “can focus on any or all of the main issues likely to arise 
in the context of a merger investigation” (Monti 2001b, 2). During the merger review 
process, such contacts can occur via telephone calls, faxes, emails and even face-to-face 
interactions during the EU’s oral hearings and US’s pitch meetings.
Review process contacts include a variety of exchanges of information designed 
to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. More specifically, review process 
contacts frequently target substantive issues such as the definition of relevant product and 
geographic markets and the assessment of the likely competitive effects of the proposed 
                                                          
8 This list of triggering circumstances includes matters that
 are relevant to enforcement activities of the other party;
 involve anti-competitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) carried out in significant 
part in the other party’s territory;
 involve  a  merger  or  acquisition  in  which  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  transaction,  or  a 
company controlling one or more of the parties ot the transaction, is a company incorporated or 
organized under the laws of the other party or one of its states or member states;
 involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the other party; or
 involve remedies that would, insignificant respects, require or prohibit conduct in the other party’s 
territory (Parisi 1999, 1136).
9 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1976, 15 U.S.C.§ 18A(h).12
merger on the relevant markets (European Commission 2000b, 3). However, even the use 
of similar market definitions does not always guarantee convergent decisions because of 
differing market conditions and competitive realities in the EU and US (Janow 2000, 44).
While review process contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the 
regulators, information exchanged during these contacts must respect the rights of 
confidentiality afforded to firms by domestic law. Competition regulators are very careful 
to conform to this constraint on their discretionary authority for fear of violating relevant 
domestic statutes, which, in turn, would likely to prompt political intervention. This 
feature of the institutional landscape of EU and US competition policies opens a potential 
avenue for firms to exert influence in concurrent jurisdiction merger reviews. However, 
as discussed above, most firms waive their rights to confidentiality in merger cases in 
order to facilitate EU-US implementation cooperation and expedite the review process. In 
fact, competition regulators explicitly encourage merging firms to waive their rights to 
confidentiality as a way to increase the effectiveness of cooperation and the likelihood of 
consistent decisions.
10
EU and US competition regulators do not typically make public comments 
regarding their respective review processes or transatlantic review process contacts. 
Rather, they prefer (and in some cases are legally required by domestic law) that their 
respective review processes and transatlantic review process contacts remain confidential 
until they are prepared to announce publicly whether or not to oppose a proposed 
transaction. Similarly, the competition regulators prefer that other actors not publicize 
ongoing cases.
11 Such publicity can lead to a politicization of the merger review process. 
Demonstrating this aversion to publicity during the review process, Parisi argues that
trying the case in public is of little utility. The U.S. agencies normally keep 
silent during the course of an investigation—even where the press reports 
on it. And FTC Commissioners are constrained by judicial decisions 
limiting their utterances while an action is pending, lest their decision be 
tainted with prejudice. Suffice it to say that trying to use the press as a 
separate front for advocacy of your case is a diversion from the necessary 
task of dealing effectively with the enforcement agency on the merits of the 
case. The same can be said for ‘politicizing’ the matter by appeals to 
parliamentarians or officials of other government agencies (1999, 141).
                                                          
10 See 2002 EU-US Guidelines on Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations.
11 For an example of firms attempting to publicize a merger review and reactions by competition regulators, 
see the GE/Honeywell case discussed below.13
Review process contacts occur in most internationally-oriented merger cases that 
are simultaneously investigated by EU and US regulators. Unfortunately, systematic and 
consistently reliable reporting of these intensive and sometimes mundane and technical 
contacts is not available. However, selected evidence of close and “effective” (i.e., 
contributing to convergent decisions) implementation cooperation is documented and 
made regularly available in a variety of forms. For instance, such references are 
ubiquitous in speeches made by EU and US competition officials. More formally, the 
European Commission reports annually to the European Parliament and Council of 
Ministers on bilateral cooperation with the US competition authorities. These reports 
showcase and provide brief descriptions of competition cases in which EU-US review 
process contacts are particularly effective or ineffective.
4. Remedial Contacts
Remedial contacts occur when EU and/or US competition regulators determine 
that certain conditions will have to be met before final approval is granted to a proposed 
merger. The consideration of remedies, which are submitted by the firms, is part of the 
overall merger review process. However, this is considered a separate stage of 
implementation cooperation for the current study because, while competition regulators 
may agree throughout the review process contacts, they may disagree on the precise 
nature of the remedies necessary for approval. Like the other stages of implementation 
cooperation, remedial contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the EU and US 
competition regulators.
As the Commission argues, EU-US cooperation via remedial contacts is 
specifically in the interest of the firms involved: “co-operation in the devising of 
remedies can help the notifying parties avoid ‘double-jeopardy’ whereby they are 
required to negotiate remedies sequentially, and thus have to make further concessions to 
the second agency to secure the clearance of a deal which has already received the 
blessing of the first” (European Commission 1999, 4.2). While remedial contacts are 
important for merging firms, their importance for competition regulators is fundamentally 
based in the fact that disagreements over remedies can lead to divergent decisions, which 14
may prompt political intervention. As discussed below, remedial contacts have evolved to 
include discretionary cooperation in market testing and implementation of remedies, two 
practical areas of merger review not explicitly identified in the Bilateral Agreement.
Remedial contacts represent the last practical stage of EU and US competition 
regulators engaging in implementation cooperation. Based on the data provided in the 
Commission’s annual reports and the commentaries of EU officials, remedial contacts 
provide another means by which EU and US competition regulators reduce the likelihood 
of divergent (especially conflicting) decisions. In addition, the use of remedial contacts 
suggests that the EU and US competition regulators are increasing their implementation 
cooperation through their discretionary authority—market-testing and implementation of 
remedies.
IV. Flawed Cases of EU-US Implementation Cooperation
The preceding discussion suggests that EU-US implementation cooperation 
functions smoothly and tends to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. If 
competition regulators have reduced the likelihood of divergent decisions, then political 
intervention should be unlikely in individual concurrent jurisdiction merger cases. In fact, 
this is what appears to have happened. However, political intervention, while infrequent, 
does still occur. While implementation cooperation has contributed to depoliticizing 
transatlantic competition relations by reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions, 
competition policy—especially international cooperation in competition policy—remains 
susceptible to politicization.
Signs of politicization were particularly evident in two concurrent jurisdiction 
merger cases: the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger and the 2001 
GE/Honeywell (GEH) merger. EU and US competition regulators regard implementation 
cooperation to have been particularly “flawed” in these two cases. The current study uses 
the term “flawed” to indicate an outcome that deviates from the preferences of the 
competition regulators. Such deviations display significant levels of political intervention 
in and/or public challenges by private actors to the merger review process despite 
implementation cooperation. Based on their preferences and the cooperative framework 
created by the regulators, such political intervention and public challenges are 15
undesirable outcomes. From the perspective of the competition regulators, the occurrence 
of such undesirable outcomes suggests a flaw in the framework or in the way in which it 
was implemented in these two cases. Therefore, both of these cases require more in depth 
analysis to understand where and why flaws occurred in the different stages of 
implementation cooperation.
1. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger of 1997
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger was the first significant flawed 
case of EU-US implementation cooperation since the 1991 Bilateral Agreement first 
established a cooperative framework for transatlantic competition relations. The case 
provoked considerable public and private attention because it involved a merger between 
two large US firms that was challenged in the EU but approved in the US. The EU’s 
divergent decision and the subsequent US reaction surprised many observers in Brussels 
and Washington and contributed to the high-profile of the case. Due to the intransigent 
positions of the EU and US, the case “took the United States and European Union to the 
brink of a trade war” (Evenett et al. 2000, vii).
12 However, the flawed nature of this case 
appears to be rather easily explained. The escalation of the case should not surprise 
observers because such a divergent decision by competition regulators is likely to be 
perceived as a threat to national and/or constituent interests and, therefore, should prompt 
political intervention. In the end, the BMD merger was particularly significant not 
because of the escalation of political intervention, but because it served as a valuable 
learning experience on a number of fronts for both EU and US competition regulators.
The intent of the current discussion is to draw out lessons from the BMD case for 
regulators, politicians and merging firms. More detailed reports of the substantive issues 
of the merger and the divergent analyses taken by the EU and US can be found 
elsewhere.
13
This case began when the Boeing Company and the McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation (MDC), two US aerospace companies, announced plans to merge on 
                                                          
12 For similar claims, see ICPAC (2000) and Coleman et al. (1997).
13 For example, see Damro (2001), Boeder (2000), ICPAC (2000), Van Miert (2000), Karpel (1998), Peck 
(1998), Fox (1997) and Snyder (1997).16
December 15, 1996.
14 In accordance with the provisions of the Bilateral Agreement, and 
following the receipt of formal notification from the merging firms, the EU and US 
competition regulators notified each other that they were both opening their own 
investigations into the BMD case.
Following a preliminary investigation in Phase I, the Commission announced its 
intent to open an in-depth Phase II investigation on March 17, 1997. The Commission 
was concerned that Boeing already enjoyed a dominant position in the global market for 
aircraft over 100 seats—a position that would be strengthened by adding MDC. More 
specifically, the deal would have increased Boeing’s share of the market in aircraft over 
100 seats from 64 to 70 percent and left Airbus as the only other competitor in that 
product market. In addition, the Commission was concerned that the merger would 
increase significantly Boeing’s defense and space business. In early May, the EU’s 
Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert also expressed his concerns about Boeing’s 
twenty-year exclusive supply agreements with American Airlines and Delta Airlines, 
declaring them “totally unacceptable” (Morrocco 1997, 24). These agreements would 
have locked the airlines into purchasing arrangements requiring them to buy from only 
the newly merger BMD for twenty years.
On May 21, the Commission issued its formal Statement of Objections. The 
statement outlined the EU’s concern that the merger would strengthen Boeing’s existing 
dominant position. According to the MCR, such a transaction would be anticompetitive.
15
At this point, the US’s FTC was unable to comment on the merger because its review was 
still ongoing (White House 1998a).
The EU’s Statement of Objections included concerns over the impact of the 
merger on competition in the defense industry. However, following a communiqué from 
the US requesting comity considerations, the Commission agreed not to investigate the 
defense related portions of the merger. In accordance with the Bilateral Agreement, the 
Commission’s decision reflected a determination that this aspect of the merger 
represented an “important interest” of the US. The fact that the EU dropped its defense 
                                                          
14 According to the agreement, Boeing would purchase McDonnell Douglas for $13.3 billion.
15 Under the MCR, the Commission is mandated to prevent the creation or strengthening of “a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market 
or in a substantial part of it” (Article 2[2]).17
related complaints suggests that the Commission calculated that including such a 
politically sensitive subject as defense would have increased significantly the likelihood 
of political intervention from the US (i.e., White House and Congress).
On July 1, it became apparent that the decisions of the EU and US competition 
regulators were significantly diverging. On that day, the FTC approved the BMD merger. 
According to the FTC’s analysis, the merger would not raise significant competition 
concerns because MDC was no longer competitive in the commercial transport market 
(Sparaco 1997, 67). Because the FTC approved the merger, remedial contacts between 
the US and EU competition authorities were necessarily limited.
In the hopes of gaining similar approval in the EU, BMD submitted a new 
package of remedies to the Commission. This package was rejected by the Commission 
after closed-door negotiations on July 16. According to Boeing, the Commission’s 
rejection was based on lingering concerns over BMD’s dominant position and the 
exclusive supply agreements (Boeing 1997a).
Facing an intransigent Commission and with a final decision in the case scheduled 
for July 23, US politicians began to intervene in the process with threats of retaliation. 
These threats of retaliation took the form of numerous foreign intervention instruments. 
Once it became clear that the EU would not approve the merger without remedies (i.e., a 
divergent decision), the White House intervened with President William J. Clinton stating 
that he might consider a complaint to the World Trade Organization or retaliatory tariffs 
if no resolution was reached.
16 The US legislature also intervened in the review process. 
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions opposing EU 
“interference” in a US business transaction.
17 On July 16, the US Senate unanimously 
approved a resolution that condemned the EU for its intentions (Wolf 1997).
Roberto provides a useful summary of the political intervention that occurred in 
the BMD case as well as the Commission’s reaction:
Congress, led by legislators from Boeing’s home state of Washington, 
quickly responded. In its July 23, 1997 resolution chastising the EC’s 
actions, the U.S. House of Representatives said the EC was ‘apparently 
                                                          
16 Clinton stated that “we have a system for managing this through the World Trade Organization and we 
have some options ourselves when actions are taken by Europe in this regard” (White House 1998b).
17 H.R. Res. 191, 105
th Cong. (1997), 143 Cong. Record 5550 (1997); S. Res. 108, 105
th Cong. (1997), 143 
Cong. Record 7609 (1997).18
determined to disapprove the merger to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage for Airbus Industries, a government-owned aircraft 
manufacturer; and… this dispute could threaten to disrupt the overall 
relationship between the EU and the United States which had a two-way 
trade in goods and services of approximately $366 billion in 1996’.
18
Furthermore, resolutions passed in both the House and Senate vowed that 
any disapproval by the EC of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger 
‘would constitute an unwarranted and unprecedented interference in a 
United States business transaction that would threaten thousands of 
American aerospace jobs’.
19 In addition, reports circled that the Clinton 
administration threatened to challenge government subsidies to Airbus 
Industries before the WTO or to impose taxes or penalties on Airbus-
manufactured planes sold in the United States.
20 The FTC was in turn 
accused of trying to protect a ‘national champion’ by approving the 
merger
21… Meanwhile, Van Miert insisted that the EC was not out to 
protect Airbus
22 (1998, 598-599).
For their part, Boeing and MDC continued to resist the demands of the 
Commission despite a fast-approaching MCR deadline for a final decision. Finally, 
facing the reality that the EU was not going to change its decision, the merging firms 
contacted the Commission with an eleventh-hour solution on July 23. Boeing Chairman 
and CEO, Philip Condit, argued that BMD’s concessions were made due to a fear that the 
newly merged company would have faced “large fines and potential harm to our 
customers” without EU approval (Boeing 1997b, 1). The Commission accepted the final 
package of remedies offered by BMD, which addressed each of the EU’s competition 
concerns.
23 Formal authorization of the merger as compatible with the SEM came on July 
30. The newly-merger BMD began operating on August 4 as the largest aerospace 
company in the world (Damro 2001, 215).
2. The Lessons of BMD
                                                          
18 H.R. Res. 191.
19 H.R. Res. 191 and S. Res. 108.
20 …Vice President Al Gore stated that the United States would act quickly if a U.S. company were put at 
an ‘unfair competitive disadvantage because of an improperly motivated regulatory decision of a foreign 
country.’ See Stanley Holmes and Michele Flores, “Boeing Deal Tussle About Trade,” Seattle Times, May 
15, 1997, at D1.
21 See ‘Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time’, Economist, August 1, 1997, at 59, 61.
22 See Emma Tucker, Editorial, ‘Van Miert’s Finest Hour’, Financial Times, July 24, 1997, at 11.
23 For the exact remedies, see Boeing (1997b).19
The BMD case provides a clear instance of divergent decisions and political 
intervention. As such, the case reveals useful insights for the current study. The case 
supports claims that politicians are likely to perceive divergent decisions as threats to 
national and/or constituent interests. Based on this perception, US politicians decided to 
intervene in the case with a variety of foreign intervention instruments. The outcome of 
the case, however, suggests that targeting such political pressure at the Commission is of 
little utility.
In addition, this flawed case served as a valuable learning experience for many 
actors involved in the merger review process. While the Bilateral Agreement had been 
signed six years prior, the competition regulators’ experience at cooperating under the 
provisions was still limited. As Parisi argues “Unfortunately, despite the enforcement 
agencies’ best efforts to explain the Agreement and operations under it, some 
misunderstandings of the Agreement were reported, particularly during the course of the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case” (1999, 137).
24 Charles S. Stark, Chief of the 
Foreign Commerce Section in the DoJ’s Antitrust Division, made clear the valuable 
lessons learned from BMD:
Divergent antitrust approaches to the same transaction undermine 
confidence in the process; they risk imposing inconsistent requirements on 
the firms, or frustrating the remedial objectives of one or another of the 
antitrust authorities; and they may create frictions or suspicions that can 
extend beyond the antitrust arena—as we witnessed in the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas matter. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
experience led the agencies on both sides to draw a deep breath and 
commit themselves to extra and sustained efforts to make the coordination 
process work as well as it possibly can (italics added) (Stark 2000, 5).
Interviewees familiar with the BMD case agree that the merger showed 
competition regulators that they should share more information in the early stages of their 
respective review processes in order to reduce the likelihood of surprising their foreign 
counterparts with an analysis that will likely result in a divergent decision. This lesson 
was not lost on subsequent EU-US implementation cooperation. In fact, after BMD, the 
US and EU competition regulators began exchanging and discussing mergers much 
sooner in their respective review process (i.e., initial contacts) and more intensively. 20
Indeed, research interviewees agree that the lessons learned from the BMD merger 
contributed to the success of the “best practice” case of WorldCom/MCI a year later.
3. The GE-Honeywell Merger of 2001
The 2001 GE/Honeywell (GEH) merger is another flawed case of EU-US 
implementation cooperation in competition policy. Like the BMD merger, the case 
provoked considerable public and private attention because it showcased a merger 
between two large US firms that was challenged in the EU but approved in the US. As 
discussed above, such an outcome should certainly prompt political intervention. Unlike 
the BMD case, GEH ended with the firms abandoning the merger instead of agreeing to 
implement the remedies required by the EU. If the BMD merger case served as a valuable 
learning experience for the EU and US competition regulators, how and why did the 
GEH merger case become flawed? Did the competition regulators forget the lessons 
learned from BMD?
The following discussion of the GEH merger again focuses on the motivations of 
regulators, politicians and firms. More detailed discussions of the GEH merger and the 
divergent analyses taken by the EU and US are reported elsewhere.
25 The following 
analysis of the merger focuses on the behavior of the EU competition authorities as the 
regulators who withheld approval of the merger.
26
On October 22, 2000, two US firms—the General Electric Company (GE) and 
Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell)—entered into an agreement under which 
General Electric 2000 Merger Sub, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of GE, would be 
merged with Honeywell. As a result, Honeywell would become a wholly owned 
subsidiary of GE.
27 While GE’s diversification strategy had included a number of prior 
mergers, the transaction with Honeywell would be its largest ever.
                                                                                                                                                                            
24 “One such misconception was the assertion that, in a merger notified to both parties, one party ‘goes 
first’ while the other defers. This is clearly wrong… (Parisi 1999, 137).
25 For example, see Fox (2007), Morgan and McGuire (2004), Burnside (2002) and Pflanz and Caffarra 
(2002).
26 For more on the US DoJ’s review of the GEH merger and differences with the EU, see Evans (2002).
27 GE and Honeywell are highly diversified industrial firms. According to the European Commission, GE is 
“active  in  fields  including  aircraft  engines,  appliances,  information  services,  power  systems,  lighting, 
industrial systems,  medical systems, plastics, broadcasting (through the NBC media channel), financial 
services  and  transportation  systems”  while  Honeywell  is  “an  advanced  technology  and  manufacturing 
company  serving  customers  worldwide  with  aerospace  products  and  services,  automotive  products, 21
On February 5, 2001, the Commission received the formal notification of the 
proposed merger pursuant to Article 4 of the MCR. Proposed as the largest industrial 
merger in history and active in the EU’s Single Market, the GE/Honeywell merger easily 
met the thresholds in the MCR and fell within the EU’s jurisdiction.
28 At the time, GE’s 
CEO Jack Welch announced publicly “This is the cleanest deal you’ll ever see… Every 
single activity, there is no product overlap… Everything is complementary. That’s not a 
speech for the antitrust people, that’s fact” (Murray et al. 2001, A1). However, on March 
1, 2001, the Commission took an alternative view and decided to initiate Phase II 
proceedings in the case.
On May 8, 2001, the Commission released a Statement of Objections identifying 
competition concerns surrounding the proposed GE/Honeywell merger. According to the 
Commission’s press release,
GE alone already had a dominant position in the markets for jet engines for 
large commercial and large regional aircraft. Its strong market position 
combined with its financial strength and vertical integration into aircraft 
leasing were among the factors that led to the finding of GE’s dominance 
in these markets. The investigation also showed that Honeywell is the 
leading supplier of avionics and non-avionics products, as well as of 
engines for corporate jets and of engine starters (i.e., a key input in the 
manufacturing of engines). The combination of the two companies’ 
activities would have resulted in the creation of dominant positions in the 
markets for the supply of avionics, non-avionics and corporate jet engines, 
as well as to the strengthening of GE’s existing dominant positions in jet 
engines for large commercial and large regional jets. The dominance would 
have been created or strengthened as a result of horizontal overlaps in some 
markets as well as through the extension of GE’s financial power and 
vertical integration to Honeywell activities and of the combination of their 
respective complementary products. Such integration would enable the 
merged entity to leverage the respective market power of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                            
electronic materials, specialty chemicals, performance polymers, transportation and power systems as well 
as home, building and industrial controls” (2001a, 2).
28 Due to confidentiality provisions, the exact numbers for GE and Honeywell turnover are not available. 
According to the Commission,
The  undertakings concerned  have a  combined  aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of  more 
than  EUR  5  000  million  (for  the  full  year  1999,  EUR  [...]  *  for  GE  and  [...]*  for 
Honeywell).  Both  GE and  Honeywell have a  Community-wide  turnover in  excess  of 
EUR 250 million (for the full year 1999, [...]* for GE and [...]* for Honeywell), but they 
do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within 
one  and  the  same  Member  State.  The  notified  operation  therefore  has  a  Community 
dimension” (European Commission 2001a, 3).
The parts of this text that are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk were edited by the 
Commission to ensure that confidential information was not disclosed.22
companies into the products of one another. This would have the effect of 
foreclosing competitors, thereby eliminating competition in these markets, 
ultimately affecting adversely product quality, service and consumers’ 
prices (European Commission 2001b, 1-2).
In its objection, the Commission clearly stated its concerns over GE’s existing 
dominant position in specific relevant markets. According to the MCR, a merger that 
strengthens such a dominant position is likely to be anticompetitive and, therefore, should 
not be approved.
29 However, the EU’s objections were also based on the use of an 
analytical tool in merger review known as “bundling” (Pflanz and Caffarra 2002). The 
economic theory of bundling suggests that competition may be undermined if a firm 
“bundles” its products from different markets because the combined range of products 
would give it “undo power” (Murray et al. 2001, A4). Reflecting this concern over 
bundling, an EU competition official, Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, “argued that by buying 
Honeywell, GE could parlay its powerful position in the large jet-engine market into 
possible dominance of a related industry, avionics, which produces crucial flight 
equipment. Honeywell is one of the strongest players in this market” (Murray et al. 2001, 
A4). Thus, a central problem with the proposed GEH merger was that GE could abuse its 
dominance in the future by bundling aircraft engines with flight equipment.
Because bundling relies on a prediction of the future structure of the market(s) and 
behavior of the firm, analysis of dominance may be particularly problematic when 
combined with or replaced by concerns over “bundling”. On this basis, GE rejected the 
Commission’s use of the economic theory of bundling from the beginning of the review 
process. In the US, the DoJ did not use bundling in its analysis.
30 This divergence in the 
analytical concepts used by the EU and US regulators might have been overcome by 
closer cooperation at an earlier stage. However, as discussed below, initial contacts 
between the two competition agents were limited due, in part, to the speed with which the 
merger agreement had been reached between GE and Honeywell and the firms’ 
                                                          
29 Under the MCR, the Commission is mandated to prevent the creation or strengthening of “a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market 
or in a substantial part of it” (Article 2[2]).
30 According to Hargreaves and Spiegel, the Chicago School was largely “responsible for discrediting the 
theory of ‘bundling’ in the US” (2001, 4). In addition, US commentators have argued “Although often 
applied  in  the  computer  industry,  the  bundling  theory  isn’t  widely  accepted  in  aerospace…  where 
sophisticated buyers, not consumers, choose among a relative handful of players” (Murray et al. 2001, A4).23
reluctance to authorize pre-notification contacts between its legal counsel and the EU’s 
Competition Directorate.
31
After months of contentious negotiations, on June 14, 2001, GEH submitted a 
proposal to address the Commission’s concerns about the proposed merger. While this 
submission came before the MCR’s formal deadline, GEH made it clear to the 
Commission that this was its “last offer” (European Commission 2001c, 1). As the 
Commission notes,
GE submitted a proposal for a package of undertakings to address the 
competition concerns identified by the Commission in its Statement of 
Objections of 8 May 2001. The proposal comprised structural undertakings 
relating to avionics- and non-avionics products, engine starters, small 
marine gas turbines, large regional jet engines and behavioural 
undertakings concerning corporate jet engines, the commitment not to 
engage in bundling practices and GECAS (2001a, 112).
The role of GECAS (GE Capital Aviation Services) would become a prominent 
point of contention between the merging firms and the Commission.
32 In particular, 
GEH’s dominant position could be used to leverage GECAS—“the largest purchaser of 
aircraft, ahead of any airline” (EU Press Release 2001)—into purchasing and/or leasing 
only planes with GEH aircraft engines and flight equipment.
On the same day that GEH submitted its “last offer”, the Commission announced 
that the proposal was insufficient to remove the competition problems identified in the 
Statement of Objections (European Commission 2001b, 2). The Commission also noted 
that it was regretful that GEH’s proposal did not reflect remedies that the Commission 
had suggested earlier in the review process. These remedies were structural commitments 
that would have addressed the Commission’s concerns over GECAS:
In particular, we have explored with the parties commitments which would 
not have entailed further divestments in the aerospace industry but rather a 
structural commitment to modify the commercial behaviour of GECAS. 
We regret that this avenue has not been pursued. Unless the merger 
notification is formally withdrawn, the Commission will continue with the 
review procedure (European Commission 2001c, 1).
                                                          
31 More precisely, the merger was investigated by the EU’s Merger Task Force, a unit within the 
Competition Directorate that no longer exists.
32 GE Capital is GE’s financial arm, while GECAS is GE Capital’s aircraft leasing unit.24
GEH did not withdraw the merger notification, and the Commission continued its 
review in accordance with the procedures established under the MCR. In response to the 
Commission’s rejection of the offer, GE’s Jack Welch declared publicly “You are never 
too old to get surprised… The European regulators’ demands [for divestitures] exceeded 
anything I or our European advisers imagined and differed sharply from antitrust 
counterparts in the US and Canada” (Hargreaves and Spiegel 2001, 1).
Following the EU’s rejection, negotiations continued between the Commission 
and the firms. However, by this time, US politicians began intervening in the merger 
review process. For example, US Attorney General Ashcroft dispatched a senior political 
appointee, Deborah Herman, to meet with EU officials to explain why the Department of 
Justice had approved the merger. In addition, “On June 15
th, [President] Bush said he was 
‘concerned’ about the European position” (Economist 2001, 5). Finally, Senator Jay 
Rockefeller wrote a letter to the Commission supporting the merger (Sorkin 2001, C9).
This political pressure was likely supported (if not initiated) by GEH. As Hill 
reports, “‘At the time, we thought it would be impossible that the Europeans would try to 
block a U.S.-U.S. deal that had been given the go-ahead by Washington,’ said an 
executive close to G.E. who spoke on the condition of anonymity. ‘The conventional 
wisdom was that the political pressure would be too great’” (2001, C4). In addition to the 
increasing political intervention by US politicians, GEH also stepped up its publicity 
campaign to increase pressure on the Commission.
This strategy of publicity and any belief that political pressure might change the 
Commission’s decision were clearly not informed by the lessons of the BMD merger five 
years earlier. Rather, such a strategy reflects a lack of knowledge about the 
Commission’s commitment to resist external threats to its basic interest in regulatory 
independence. For example, in response to the publicity campaign, Monti deplored 
GEH’s attempts at politicization as unjustified because the Commission had not yet 
issued its final decision in the case: “I deplore attempts to misinform the public and to 
trigger political intervention. This is entirely out of place in an antitrust case and has no 
impact on the Commission whatsoever. This is a matter of law and economics, not 
politics” (European Commission 2001d). 25
Undaunted, and perhaps emboldened, by the political and public challenges to the 
EU’s merger review process, Commissioner Monti reiterated the Union’s opposition to 
the merger on June 18, declaring that it
would combine GE’s strong position in the aircraft engine markets with 
Honeywell’s similarly strong position in avionics and non-avionics such as 
weather turbulence detection products, collision avoidance and flight 
management systems and so-called black boxes. To this powerful combine, 
one must also add GE’s leasing and financial arms, respectively GECAS, 
the largest purchaser of aircraft, ahead of any airline—and GE Capital. 
This could lead to less competition in the engine and in the aerospace 
sectors and result in higher prices for customers in the medium term 
(European Commission 2001d).
On June 26, 2001, the EU’s Member States entered the merger review process. In 
accordance with the MCR, the representatives of the fifteen national competition 
authorities convened as the Advisory Committee on Concentrations (ACC) and endorsed 
the Commission’s draft decision to block GE/Honeywell merger.
33 Before the ACC 
decision, GE initiated extensive lobbying efforts in the Member States (Sorkin 2001, 
C9).
34 This strategy was not likely to be useful because the ACC is simply advisory, it 
cannot reject or amend such reports. In any event, the ACC’s endorsement of the 
Commission’s draft decision suggests that GEH’s lobbying efforts had little effect on the 
Member States.
The Commission’s final decision was scheduled for June 30, 2001. Despite 
having submitted its “last offer”, GE re-entered negotiations with the EU on July 27. This 
reversal of position may have been the result of the original GEH merger agreement that 
required GE to make its “best effort” to pursue regulatory approval of the merger (Sorkin 
2001, C9). Under the terms of the merger agreement, had GE not re-entered negotiations 
with the Commission, Honeywell may have taken them to court and GE could have faced 
penalties.
During the renewed negotiations, GE did propose additional remedies, which 
were submitted to the Commission on June 28, 2001. According to the Commission,
                                                          
33 The exact voting in the ACC is not publicly available. However, leaks to the press suggest that only two 
members did not support the draft: Greece was not present and Ireland abstained from the vote (Sorkin 
2001, C9).
34 For more on these national lobbying efforts, see Meller (2001).26
At a very late stage in the procedure… the parties withdrew the package of 
undertakings submitted on 14 June 2001 and proposed a new and 
substantially modified set of undertakings. The new proposal relates to the 
sale of a minority interest in GECAS to third parties selected by GE 
combined with the behavioural commitments already submitted concerning 
GECAS’s conduct in its dealings with Honeywell. In parallel, the parties 
reduce their proposed divestitures of Honeywell aerospace products 
(European Commission 2001a, 122-123).
However, the Commission remained unconvinced by the new offer, arguing that “In the 
present case the proposed undertakings are insufficient, they do not allow sufficient time 
for consultation and in any event they do not solve the competition problems identified” 
(European Commission 2001a, 125).
In the US, political attention remained focused on the case. For example, Paul H. 
O’Neill, US Secretary of the Treasury “attacked the European Commission, saying that it 
would be ‘off the wall’ for European regulators to block the deal, which American 
regulators have already approved” (Sorkin and Meller 2001, C1). Mr. O’Neill also 
intervened publicly stating
that the European Commission had too much power. ‘They are the closest 
thing you can find to an autocratic organization that can successfully 
impose their will on things that one would think are outside their scope of 
attention,’ he said. ‘When I see things like this, they’re irritating,’ Mr. 
O’Neill added, ‘and yes, I’d like to say they need to stop, but they will stop 
in time’ (Sorkin and Meller 2001, C2).
For its part, GEH began to view its proposed merger as a lost cause. In candid 
terms, GE’s soon-to-be chairman and CEO Jeffrey Immelt revealed the dire 
circumstances when he admitted “We [GEH and the Commission] are so far apart that 
this is not a place where we would use political pressure” (Sorkin 2001, C9). Immelt’s 
comments are notable for their implied understanding that political pressure was viewed 
as a possible (but no longer useful) option for winning regulatory approval of a 
concurrent jurisdiction merger.
Despite the publicity and political pressure, the EU regulators stood firm on their 
economic analysis of the proposed merger. On what would this time be GE’s actual last 
offer, the Commission remained unconvinced for a number of reasons:
On 28 June 2001, two weeks later and well beyond the deadline for the 
submission of undertakings, GE proposed a new set of remedies. Apart 27
from the fact that these remedies were not adequate to deal with the 
competition concerns, they were submitted at a very late stage in the 
procedure and continued to present a series of technical shortcomings. 
Indeed, according to the Commission’s Notice on remedies acceptable 
under the Merger Regulation, the Commission can only accept modified 
commitments when these solve the competition concerns in a clear and 
straightforward manner without the need for a further market test. The offer 
submitted by GE on 28 June did not meet this condition. The remedies 
proposed post-deadline were not sufficiently clear-cut to solve the 
identified competition concerns in a straightforward manner and could 
therefore not be accepted (Giotakos et al. 2001, 12-13).
The formal rejection of this final offer came on June 30, 2001, when the EU declared the 
merger incompatible with the SEM.
35
4. The Lessons of GEH
On its own, the GEH merger case is significant because, as Monti acknowledged, 
“this was the first time the European Union and U.S. antitrust agencies have looked at the 
same facts in the same market and gone different ways” (Lawsky 2001, 1). Like the 
BMD merger case, GEH also provides lessons for implementation cooperation. For the 
competition regulators, information asymmetries may have contributed to the divergent 
analyses, in particular the use of the economic concept of bundling. Despite the lessons of 
BMD, the regulators’ ability to engage in extensive initial and review process contacts 
was limited in this case by the speed with which the original merger agreement was 
reached between the firms (see below). In addition, the GEH case reveals how 
tenaciously competition regulators will resist external threats to their basic interest in 
regulatory independence. The external threats came in the form of political pressure and 
publicity campaigns, both of which challenged the regulator’s own preference to 
maximize certainty and decision-making authority, and, therefore, were resisted.
For the US politicians, the EU’s divergent regulatory decision—blocking a 
merger between two US firms that, at the time, was the largest industrial merger ever and 
was approved by the US competition regulators—was perceived as an unequivocal threat 
                                                          
35 For more on the EU’s reasons for blocking the merger, see Pflanz and Caffarra (2002) and Giotakos et al. 
(2001).28
to national and/or constituent interests that prompted their intervention in the review 
process.
The GEH case also provides lessons for firms engaging in concurrent jurisdiction 
mergers. Up to this point, the current study has emphasized the fact that merging firms 
can exert influence in implementation cooperation by exercising their rights to 
confidentiality of sensitive business information. However, the GEH merger case 
provides additional insights into how firms can influence the merger review process. 
These lessons are based on (mis)calculations made by the merging firms in the merger 
review process, not necessarily on the general process of implementation cooperation. 
Nevertheless, they reveal additional means by which the likelihood of political 
intervention may be increased significantly in the merger review process.
The first lesson concerns the speed by which the merger was originally agreed. 
The GEH deal was notable for being “negotiated over a three-day weekend, too fast for 
the company to even consult its outside antitrust counsel or notify regulators” (Murray et 
al. 2001, A1).
36 GE itself admitted that the deal had been reached too quickly to engage 
actively in pre-notification contacts with the European Commission. As Hill argues,
Mr. Welch’s first mistake on the Honeywell deal was apparent the day he 
announced it. ‘We haven’t touched every base,’ he said when asked
whether G.E. and Honeywell had contacted regulators in the United States 
and Europe, as is often the case on big transactions. Indeed, the deal was 
negotiated in only 72 hours by Mr. Welch, who rushed to break up a 
planned merger between Honeywell and United Technologies, an old-style 
conglomerate that makes Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines and Otis 
Elevators (2001, C4).
While Welch was renowned for his decisiveness, the decision to proceed quickly 
with the merger created early problems with the regulators: “Mr. Welch’s decisiveness… 
led him to put the deal together in just a few days without sounding out regulators. And 
when they balked, he refused to make enough concessions to satisfy them” (Sorkin 
2001). As a result of these limited contacts with the regulators, “It was more than two 
months before Mr. Welch realized that the deal could face serious obstacles in Europe, 
executives close to him said” (Hill 2001, C4). Thus, regarding the initial merger 
                                                          
36 In addition, “GE conceded yesterday that the Honeywell deal came together too quickly for it to consult 
its European merger lawyers” (Murray et al. 2001, A4).29
agreement, the preceding analysis suggests that no matter how quickly a merger deal is 
agreed, legal counsel in Brussels and/or Washington should be consulted immediately. 
GE’s problems in this regard appear to have emerged because of the firm’s desire to sign 
a merger agreement as quickly as possible (72 hours) in order to beat United 
Technologies to the punch.
A separate but related lesson from the GEH merger relates to the initial contacts 
stage of the review process. During this stage, pre-notification contacts (PNCs) between 
the merging firms and the EU’s Competition Directorate occur under the discretionary 
authority of competition regulators as confidential meetings and other less formal 
contacts arranged prior to formal notification of a merger deal.
37 At these meetings, case 
handlers usually inquire about what markets will be involved, what the current market 
shares are of the merging firms and what the future market position will be of the merged 
firm.
38 The Competition Directorate publicly advocates the use of PNCs, which are 
becoming increasingly viewed as standard operating procedures. Because they occur 
prior to the formal notification of the merger, PNCs are a crucial part of the merger 
review process where firms begin making their arguments for approval of a proposed 
merger before the tight statutory deadlines are set in motion. In addition, PNCs function 
                                                          
37 The EU’s MCR requires merging firms to file a notification within seven days “after the conclusion of 
the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. That week 
shall begin when the first of those events occurs” (Article 4[1]). While not formally mentioned in the MCR, 
first contacts between regulators and firms are often taken prior to this seven-day period, during a so-called 
pre-notification phase.
There is a great deal of variation in duration of PNCs because merger agreements are constructed 
in very different ways. The actual process by which firms agree to a merger can range from a “golf-course” 
agreement to a formal Memo of Understanding between the firms. As an agreement is being reached, the 
merging firms generally will contact their legal counsel (whether in-house or a private practice law firm) to 
inquire about regulatory requirements. (Sometimes firms notify their lawyers of a merger at the same time 
the news is made publicly available. When this happens, the firms must meet the seven-day deadline for 
filing a completed Form CO. In such cases, lawyers have been known to ask for additional time, arguing 
that the Form CO cannot be completed by the deadline. When an incomplete Form CO is submitted, the 
Competition Directorate is required to ask for another filing, which further delays the entire merger review 
process. Thus, such firms are occasionally granted extensions beyond the deadline.) The legal counsel in 
Brussels then typically contacts the Competition Directorate, explaining that a merger filing is expected. 
Usually that same day, the legal counsel is informed of which case manager to contact. Within a few days, 
the legal counsel has organized a PNC meeting and submitted a memo—about five pages detailing which 
firms, sectors and markets will be involved in the proposed merger.
38 PNCs are usually attended by the case manager, two handlers, representatives of the parties and their 
outside counsel. The actual negotiators of the merger are often advised by their legal counsel to be present 
as the representatives of the merging firms.30
as an early warning system through which merging firms can be alerted to potential 
problems the Commission may have with a proposed merger.
Despite the benefits and growing use of PNCs, the sense of urgency in the GEH 
merger case limited their utility. GE and Honeywell did not authorize their legal counsel 
to engage in active and vigorous PNCs with the Commission. Had the firms done so, they 
would have been alerted that the Competition Directorate had problems with the merger 
and, possibly even that it was considering the use of the economic theory of bundling. 
Armed with this information, GE and Honeywell would have had more time to formulate 
and press their arguments and/or adjust their deal accordingly.
Another lesson for merging firms relates to GEH’s strategy of generating 
publicity to challenge the EU’s opposition to the merger. Put simply, this case suggests 
that agitating for media exposure does not increase the likelihood that the EU will 
approve a merger. Such efforts simply challenge and irritate the Competition Directorate. 
Therefore, a media campaign may actually make the Commission less likely to change its 
position on a merger. Similarly, the Commission is challenged and irritated when 
merging firms attempt to generate political intervention through the Member States of the 
EU. In the GEH case, the firms lobbied in the national capitals prior to the ACC meeting. 
However, as mentioned above, the Member States are not particularly productive targets 
for such influence because the ACC is simply advisory and operates according to a 
majority decision-making rule. The only clear impact of these strategies is that they raise 
the suspicions of the Commission that the merging firms have something to hide.
These lessons are valuable not only for firms engaging in concurrent jurisdiction 
mergers but for all firms considering mergers that will meet the MCR’s thresholds for 
review. In short, this case suggests that the EU is better consulted than challenged. But, 
what does the analysis reveal about why the GEH merger case became flawed? The 
divergent decision appears to be a central cause of the political intervention—politicians 
and commentators alike were surprised that the EU could block a merger between two 
US firms that had been approved by the US competition regulators. However, had the EU 
and US competition regulators engaged in initial contacts, they might have avoided the 
divergent decisions, including the EU’s use of bundling. Based on the BMD merger, the 
competition regulators should have been aware of this fact. So, what happened to flaw 31
their cooperative system? It appears that the merging firms are responsible for the flaw: 
the speed with which the merger agreement was reached and the resulting decision not to 
engage in PNCs severely limited the ability of the EU and US competition regulators to 
share information and potentially reach a convergent decision. In addition, the merging 
firms’ media campaign and efforts to generate political pressure may have reduced the 
likelihood that the Commission would change its decision to one that was convergent 
with the US competition regulator’s decision.
V. The Political Decision to Intervene
The preceding sections have focused on the role of firms and politicians in the 
decision-making of competition regulators. However, another important part of the story 
revolves around the decision-making of elected officials (politicians) in the merger 
review process. As the BMD and GEH cases suggest, the role of firms may help to 
explain political decisions to intervene in individual cases of regulatory cooperation in 
merger review. It would be naïve to think that firms never play a role in the political
decision to intervene in the merger review process—certainly politicians in both the EU 
and US would be less likely to intervene if they were not prompted to do so by their 
constituents, which include firms.
The BMD and GEH cases provide useful examples of the potential influence of 
firms on the political decision to intervene. If firms do play an important role in 
determining these decisions, then the US politicians likely weighed the costs of not 
intervening (offending BMD and GEH) versus the costs of intervening (offending 
competitors of BMD and GEH). But the merging firms and their competitors in both 
cases can presumably influence the decision to intervene by adjusting their political 
support (e.g., reducing, withholding or redirecting private campaign contributions and 
public endorsements).
If this is the case, a fundamental question needs to be answered. How does a 
politician determine the value of the claims of the merging firms versus the claims of 
those firms’ competitors, all of whom may be constituents and political supporters?
39
                                                          
39 For simplicity, the following discussion assumes no variation in the values attributed by politicians to the 
claims of competitors,  regardless of  whether they are  more  appropriately characterized  as domestic or 
foreign. However, it is worth noting that the foreign-based competitors of BMD and GEH, like Airbus and 32
Answering these questions requires a theory of the intervention cost calculations made by 
politicians. While such an undertaking is outside the scope of this paper, some 
preliminary comments are in order.
Two factors may prove useful for explaining the relative values attributed to these 
two different groups of firms: size and organizational ability.
40
First, a privileged position may be given to the claims of merging firms involved 
in concurrent jurisdiction mergers because of the size of such firms. As was the case in 
BMD and GEH, the merging firms were very large. They were large enough to meet the 
statutory thresholds of the US’s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and the EU’s Merger Control 
Regulation. Also, given the fact that competition regulators challenged both mergers, 
BMD and GEH controlled a large enough portion of the market that they could be 
considered to have a ‘dominant position’ in the parlance of EU competition law.
This potential explanation implies that the larger the firm, the more resources that 
firm has at its disposal to pressure politicians into intervening on their behalf. Such 
resources include, but are not limited to, campaign contributions, access to politicians and 
access to the media. Such large firms can also argue that prohibition of their merger will 
result in the loss of numerous jobs, which may adversely affect the constituent interests 
of targeted politicians. In comparison, competitors of the merging firms may be smaller 
and, in turn, have fewer political resources at their disposal. They may also have less of a 
desire to expend those resources obstructing a single merger than the merging firms’ 
desire to complete the merger—the merging firms have already fully and publicly (to 
shareholders, etc.) committed to the merger and will go to considerable lengths to ensure 
regulatory approval. The role of and arguments presented by competitors also typically 
remain part of the confidential record of the oral hearing or market-testing procedures. 
Thus, competitors may have less access to and less of a desire to use the media. These 
limitations decidedly shift the politicians’ decision to intervene in favor of the claims of 
the larger firms.
                                                                                                                                                                            
Pratt & Whitney respectively, may have been valued less by US politicians if they contributed less to 
politicians’ campaigns and/or were not really considered constituents by the politicians.
40 There are, of course, a large number of other factors that may play a role in a politician’s decision to 
intervene, including their interest in seeking media, national, and international influence, as well as their 
views on nationalism, economic competitiveness and protectionism.33
Second, a potentially useful factor for explaining the relative values attributed to 
the claims of merging firms versus competitors may by the organizational abilities of the 
two groups. Merging firms are generally well-organized, committed and united in their 
determination to achieve one goal: approval of the merger. Alternatively, competitors of 
the merging firms behave in accordance with a number of possibly different preferences 
based on their share of the market, etc. As a result, the competitors of merging firms may 
be less well-organized, committed and united in their determination to obstruct the 
merger. Because competitors are typically more numerous than the merging firms and 
have different preferences vis-à-vis any given merger, it is more difficult for them to 
reach a common, united position. As a result, they may give conflicting signals to 
politicians regarding whether a merger should be prohibited. These conflicting signals 
may be seen in conflicting testimony during pitch meetings and oral hearings. Even in 
market-testing, competitors may differ on the appropriate remedies necessary for 
approval of the merger: one competitor may support divestiture of assets that do not 
present anticompetitive challenges to another competitor; one competitor may seek 
divestiture of assets that they seek to purchase while another competitor opposes such a 
purchase on the grounds that it will create new anticompetitive problems in the market. 
These organizational problems for competitors again shift the politicians’ decision to 
intervene in favour of the merging firms.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has provided a preliminary investigation into the international and 
domestic factors at play in the EU’s implementation of its external competition policy, 
specifically in merger review. Economic internationalization seems to have prompted EU 
and US regulators to engage in extensive and intensive cooperation in the implementation 
of merger reviews that affect both jurisdictions concurrently. This cooperation is 
undertaken primarily to increase information acquisition and reduce the likelihood of 
divergent decisions while allowing for the legally-obligated duplication of work. Despite 
the resulting cooperation across a number of practical stages of the merger review 
process—initial contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial 34
contacts—the paper finds evidence of flaws that have resulted in divergent decisions and 
triggered political intervention.
The paper argues that, despite the potential to destabilise bilateral and multilateral 
trading relations, the EU regulators have a preference to make decisions (even divergent 
decisions) in merger review in accordance with their statutory mandates and without 
political intervention. In the words of former Commissioner Monti, such decisions should 
be “a matter of law and economics, not politics” (European Commission 2001d). The 
regulatory decision-making process, however, allows a number of access points for firms
and can prompt political intervention in the case of a divergent decision.
Such divergent decisions occurred in the BMD and GEH mergers. These two 
cases of flawed cooperation provide useful insights and lessons for academics as well as 
regulators, politicians and firms. While firms pressured the EU regulators in both cases, 
the empirical record shows that they did little to change the divergent decisions reached. 
This finding suggests that the preferences and strategies of individual firms under review 
play only a limited role in the EU’s implementation of external competition policy. The 
firms did, however, play a larger role in the decisions of US politicians to intervene in 
both merger cases. The paper provides preliminary comments on potential factors—size 
and organizational ability—that may lead politicians to intervene in the review process on 
behalf of the merging firms. Further research is necessary to begin theorizing the precise 
intervention cost calculations made by politicians.35
REFERENCES
Barnett, T. O. (2006) ‘Merger Work in the ICN: The Challenge of Substantive 
Convergence’, Fifth Annual Conference of the International Competition Network, Cape 
Town, South Africa, 3 May.
Boeder, Thomas L. (2000), “The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger,” in Simon J. 
Evenett, Alexander Lehmann, and Benn Steil, eds., Antitrust Goes Global: What Future 
for Transatlantic Cooperation?, 139-144. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
The Boeing Company (1997a), Press Release, July 16.
The Boeing Company (1997b), Press Release, July 23.
Burnside, Alec (2002), “GE, Honey, I Sunk the Merger,” European Competition Law 
Review 2: 107-110.
Coleman, Brian, Jeff Cole and Robert S. Greenberger (1997), “Crash Landing: Boeing’s 
Ordeal in EU Was Mostly of its Own Making,” Wall Street Journal Europe, July 28, A1.
Damro, Chad (2001), “Building an International Identity: The EU and Extraterritorial 
Competition Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 8, 2 (April): 208–226.
Devuyst, Youri (2001), “Transatlantic Competition Relations,” in Transatlantic 
Governance in the Global Economy, Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, eds., 127-
152. Lanham, Maryland, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Devuyst, Youri (2000), “Toward a Multilateral Competition Policy Regime?,” Global 
Governance 6, 3 (July-September): 319-338.
The Economist (2001), “When Neutron Jack was Nuked by Brussels,” June 15, 
Electronic Version.
European Commission (2001a), “Commission Decision Declaring a Concentration to be 
Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement,” Case No 
COMP/M.2220–General Electric/Honeywell, July 3.
European Commission (2001b), “The Commission Prohibits GE’s Acquisition of 
Honeywell,” Press Release, IP/01/939, July 3.
European Commission (2001c), “Statement on General Electric/Honeywell Merger,” 
Press Release, IP/01/842, June 14.36
European Commission (2001d), “Monti Dismisses Criticism of GE/Honeywell Merger 
Review, Deplores Politicization of the Case,” No. 47/01, June 18.
European Commission (2000a), 29
th Report on Competition Policy, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, SEC (2000) 720 Final.
European Commission (2000b), “Report to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Their 
Competition Laws: 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999,” Brussels, October 4, COM 
(2000) 618 Final.
European Commission (1999), “Report to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Their 
Competition Laws: 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998,” Brussels, April 2, COM 
(1999) 439 Final.
European Commission (1998), Merger Control Law in the European Union: Situation in 
March 1998, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities.
European Commission (1997), Press Release, IP/97/236, Brussels, March 3.
European Commission (1996), “Report to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Their 
Competition Laws: 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996,” Brussels, October 8, COM (96) 479 
Final.
European Union Delegation to the US (2001), “Monti Dismisses Criticism of 
GE/Honeywell Merger Review Deplores Politicization of the Case,” Press Release No. 
47/01, June 18.
Evans, David S. (2002), “The New Trustbusters: Brussels and Washington May Part 
Ways,” Foreign Affairs 81, 1 (January/February): 14-20.
Evenett, Simon J., Alexander Lehmann, and Benn Steil, eds. (2000), Antitrust Goes 
Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation?, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Fox, Eleanor M. (2007) ‘GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped: A Story 
of the Politics of Convergence’, in E. M. Fox and D. A. Crane (eds) Antitrust Stories, 
Foundation Press, pp. 331-360.37
Fox, Eleanor M. (1997), “Lessons from Boeing: A Modest Proposal to Keep Politics out 
of Antitrust,” Antitrust Report (November): 19-24.
Gerber, D. J. (1999) ‘The U.S.-European Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust 
Law: A Legal Experience Perspective’, New England Law Review 34, 1: 123-143.
Giotakos, Dimitri, Laurent Petit, and Gaelle Garnier and Peter De Luyck (2001), 
“General Electric/Honeywell—An Insight into the Commission’s Investigation and 
Decision,” Competition Policy Newsletter n3 (October): 5-13.
Ham, Allard D. (1993), “International Cooperation in the Anti-Trust Field and in 
Particular the Agreement between the United States of American and the Commission of 
the European Communities,” Common Market Law Review 30: 39-62.
Hargreaves, Deborah, and Peter Spiegel (2001), “Oceans Apart on Competition Policy,” 
Financial Times, June 14, electronic version.
Hill, Andrew (2001), “GE, Honeywell ask Brussels to Listen to Customers,” Financial 
Times, May 25, 22.
Hill, Andrew (2001), “Thank You and Goodbye to $43bn Adventure,” Financial Times, 
June 30, A9.
Hill, Andrew, and Deborah Hargreaves (2001), “GE, Honeywell Fall Out Over Deal,” 
Financial Times, June 30, A1.
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (2000), Final Report, Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office.
James, C. A. (2002) ‘Antitrust in the Early 21
st Century: Core Values and Convergence’, 
Program on Antitrust Policy in the 21
st Century, Brussels, Belgium, 15 May.
James, C. A. (2001) ‘International Antitrust in the 21
st Century: Cooperation and 
Convergence’, OECD Global Forum on Competition, Paris, France, 17 October.
Janow, Merit E. (2000), “Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Policy,” in Antitrust 
Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation?, Simon J. Evenett, Alexander
Lehmann, and Benn Steil, eds., 29-56. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Karpel, Amy Ann (1998), “The European Commission’s Decision on the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the 
Merger Field,” The American University Law Review 47 (April): 1029-1069.
Lawsky, David (2001), “EU Blocks General Electric’s Honeywell Takeover,” Reuters 
Newswire, July 3.38
Melamed, D. A. (2000), ‘Promoting Sound Antitrust Enforcement in the Global 
Economy’, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 27
th Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, NY, 19 October.
Meller, Paul (2001), “Another Step in Killing Deal for Honeywell,” New York Times, 
June 26, C1.
Monti, Mario (2004), ‘Convergence in EU-US antitrust policy regarding mergers and 
acquisitions: an EU perspective’, UCLA Law First Annual Institute on US an EU 
Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, Los Angeles, CA, 28 February.
Monti, Mario (2001a), ‘Antitrust in the US and Europe: A History of Convergence’, 
General Counsel Roundtable American Bar Association, Washington DC, 14 November.
Monti, Mario (2001b), “Prospects for Transatlantic Competition Policy,” Whitman 
International Lecture Series speech at the Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, March 30.
Monti, Mario (2000), “Cooperation between Competition Authorities: A Vision for the 
Future,” speech at The Japan Foundation Conference, Washington, DC, June 23.
Morgan, Eleanor J., and Steven McGuire (2004), “Transatlantic Divergence: GE-
Honeywell and the EU’s Merger Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, 1 
(February): 39-56.
Morrocco, John (1997) “US, Europe Collide over Boeing Merger,” Aviation Week & 
Space Technology 19 (May): 24.
Murray, Matt, Philip Shishkin, Bob Davis and Anita Raghavan (2001), “Oceans Apart: 
As Honeywell Deal Goes Awry for GE, Fallout May be Global,” Wall Street Journal, 
June 15, A1.
Parisi, John J. (1999), “Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities,” 
European Competition Law Review 20, 3: 133-142.
Pate, R. H. (2004) ‘Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context – from the Cicada’s Perspective’, 
Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 7 June.
Peck, Brian (1998), “Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU 
Dispute Over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict?,” 
San Diego Law Review 35 (Fall): 1163-1214.
Pflanz, Matthias, and Cristina Caffarra (2002), “The Economics of G.E./Honeywell,” 
European Competition Law Review 3: 115-121.39
Pitofsky, Robert (2000), “EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers--
Views from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,” EC Merger Control 10
th Anniversary 
Conference, EU Competition Directorate and International Bar Association, Brussels, 
Belgium, September 14-15.
Schaub, A. (2002) ‘Co-operation in Competition Policy Enforcement between the EU 
and the US and New Concepts Evolving at the World Trade Organisation and the 
International Competition Network’, Mentor Group, Brussels, Belgium, 4 April.
Snyder, David (1997), “Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Community and the 
United States: A Movement Toward a Uniform Enforcement Body,” Law and Policy in 
International Business 29 (Fall): 115-144.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross (2001), “G.E.-Honeywell Deal: If at First…” New York Times, June 
27, C1.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross (2001), “Failure to Acquire Honeywell is Sour Finish for G.E. 
Chief,” New York Times, July 3, A1.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross, and Paul Meller (2001), “G.E. Trying to Save Deal for 
Honeywell,” New York Times, June 28, C1.
Sparaco, Pierre (1997), “Europe Ups Ante over Boeing Merger,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology 14 (July): 66–7.
Stark, Charles S. (2000), “Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation,” speech at 
Conference on Competition Policy in the Global Trading System: Perspectives from 
Japan, the United States, and the European Union, the University of Oklahoma College of 
Law and The Center for Global Partnership - The Japan Foundation, Washington, DC, 
June 23.
Svetlicinii, A. (2006) ‘Cooperation Between merger Control Authorities of the EU and 
the U.S.’, University of California Davis Business Law Journal 7: 4, at 
http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article/640/.
Valentine, Debra A. (1997), “Building a Cooperative Framework for Oversight in 
Mergers: The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in Merger Review,” speech at the George 
Mason Law University, George Mason Law Review’s Antitrust Symposium, Arlington, 
VA, October 10.
Van Miert, Karel (2000), Le Marché et le Pouvoir: Sourvenirs d’un Commissaire 
Européen, Brussels, Belgium: Editions Racine.
White House (1998a), “Press Briefing by National Security Adviser Samuel Berger and
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,” Office of the Press Secretary, May 21.40
White House (1998b), “Remarks by the President and General Henry ‘Hugh’ Shelton in 
Announcement of New Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Nominee,” Office of the Press 
Secretary, July 17.
Wolf, Julie (1997), “Boeing–McDonnell Merger Plan is Closer to Rejection in Europe,” 
Wall Street Journal, July 16.